War In The Falklands Perspectives On British Strategy And Use Of Air Power

This account of the Falklands War is by the commander of the British Task Force, Admiral Sandy Woodward. On 5 April 1982, three days after the invasion of the Falkland Islands, British armed forces were ordered to sail 8,000 miles to the South Atlantic unaware of what lay ahead of them or whether they would be committed to war with Argentina. In his memoirs, Admiral Sandy Woodward, Task Force commander from the aircraft carrier Hermes, takes us from day one to day 100 of the conflict; from sailing through the waters of the Atlantic with hopes of a political settlement fading, and war becoming increasingly likely, to the repulse of the Argentinian navy and the daring amphibious landing at San Carlos Water.

Examines the political atmosphere and events leading to the Falklands war and concludes that the war was caused by critical misperceptions on both sides. Analyzes British response with emphasis on force selection, strategy, “Jointness,” and the role of airpower. Suggests that British victory hinged on a well-coordinated, joint warfighting effort, and highlights the key role played by airpower. Concludes with a caution concerning the potential for worldwide perceptions of reduced US power projection capabilities in light of budget-induced force reductions. Warns that these perceptions could lead, as they did in the Falklands, to military conflict.

The complex question of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands remains far from resolved, even after the military and political events that took place from April to June 1982. The first scholarly work of its kind, this broad and dispassionate study of the causes of the South Atlantic war between Britain and Argentina addresses the larger issues raised by the Falkland crisis and untangles a web of events and attitudes that stretch back over the past century. The book begins with a close evaluation of the two pivotal arguments: Argentina's stance that international law supports their historical right to the islands, and Britain's position that the length of their occupation of the Falklands, together with the principles of self-determination, legalized their de facto control. Gustafson then discusses how potential off-shore oil reserves, diplomacy, domestic politics, and the use of force entered into the sovereignty dispute; analyzes the effects of war on international relations; and considers possible future approaches to handling the dispute.

This book is based on a conference at Sandhurst Military College held to re-examine the events in the Falklands of spring 1982. It is a mix of those who participated in the event with historians, political scientists and journalists. Traditional explorations of war look through the lens of history and military science, focusing on big events, big battles, and big generals. By contrast, The SAGE Encyclopedia of War: Social Science Perspective views war through the lens of the social sciences, looking at the causes, processes and effects of war and drawing from a vast group of fields such as communication and mass media, economics, political science and law, psychology and sociology. Key features include: More than 650 entries organized in an A-to-Z format, authored and signed by key academics in the field Entries conclude with cross-references and further readings, aiding the researcher further in their research journeys An alternative Reader's Guide table of contents groups articles by disciplinary areas and by broad themes A helpful Resource Guide directing researchers to classic books, journals and electronic resources for more in-depth study This important and distinctive work will be a key reference for all researchers in the fields of political science, international relations and sociology.

This book provides new light on the way the Argentine forces were organized for war, the plans and reactions of the commanders, the sufferings of the soldiers and the shame and disillusionment of defeat. Martin Middlebrook has produced a genuine 'first' with this unique work. Martin Middlebrook is the only British historian to have been granted open access to the Argentines who planned and fought the Falklands War. It ranks with Liddel Hart's The Other side of the Hill in analyzing and understanding the military thinking and strategies of Britain's sometime enemy, and is essential reading for all who wish to understand the workings of military minds. The book provides new light on the way Argentine forces were organized for war, the plans and reactions of the commanders, the sufferings of the soldiers and the shame and disillusionment of defeat.

Using four warship-centered examples, this book shows how naval battles are won or lost—and how technological advantage is rarely as decisive in defeat or victory as is often claimed. • Focuses on four ship-centered battle narratives: the battle of Trafalgar, the battle of Jutland, the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, and the Falklands War • Identifies 11 perspectives that explain victory and defeat in naval operations • Provides a history-based survey of successful naval operations while highlighting the nature of naval operations in the 21st century • Presents information written in a clear, reader-friendly style without compromising on its scholarly standards of content and accuracy • Offers fascinating reading for naval college students, general audiences who enjoy naval history, and naval historians alike

War In The Falklands: Perspectives On British Strategy And Use Of Air Power

"The Falklands/Malvinas crisis of the spring of 1982 concerning sovereignty over the islands offers classic examples of multilateral, bilateral, and third-party mediation of international conflict. The United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, United States shuttle diplomacy, Peruvian conciliation efforts, and the UN Secretary General interventions failed to avert bloodshed. The armed conflict grew out of a long history of territorial dispute and was also rooted in the failure of Britain and Argentina to resolve their differences after many years of bilateral diplomatic negotiations. The conflict had developed in three main areas of contention: the first concerned the legal aspect and the claims to sovereignty of both Britain and Argentina to the Falklands. Another was Argentina's constant diplomatic pressure in pursuing its claims to the Islands. The third referred to the practical aspects for Britain of maintaining sovereignty and to their attempts to find an equitable way to relinquish it while assuring that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders would be respected. In 1826 Argentina resettled the islands and in 1833 the British evicted the Argentines. The UN, in 1965, passed a resolution which called for Britain and Argentina to proceed with negotiations to settle the
sovereignty issue. These negotiations were carried on until 1982 without resolution of the problem. A new round of negotiations began in March of 1982. The Argentine ruling junta claimed that the negotiations had broken down and they asserted that they would press their claim by other than peaceful means. A month later Argentina invaded the islands to reassert their claims of sovereignty. The US third-party mediation effort began a week later and the effort was characterized by shuttle diplomacy which took place in Buenos Aires, London and Washington, D.C. At the end of the month, Secretary of State Haig announced that the United States would provide support requested by the British. The Peruvian government worked very hard in parallel with the US diplomacy to put an end to the crisis. The UN Security Council and the Organization of American States OAS led for an end to hostilities and a withdrawal of forces on both sides. The OAS supported the Argentine position. Crisis management efforts in Britain were under the Foreign Office and involved round-the-clock participation of key governmental, military, and civilian agencies. The U.S. Interagency group was formed at the Department of State and was composed of representatives of the various State Department functional and geographical bureaus and the Pentagon. Central Intelligence Agency CIA, and the National Security Agency NSA liaisons were activated. On April 5, 1982, Britain sent a large naval force to the Falklands. The diplomats involved with the shuttle diplomacy knew, that once the task force arrived in the vicinity of the Falklands, that whatever diplomatic efforts were ongoing would be overtaken by events. The troops went ashore on East Falkland Island on May 21. The British and Argentine press were very partisan and nationalistic themes were evident on both sides. Argentine preparations for their invasion were formulated rather rapidly and the army command structure, supply system, and training were inadequate to the task of securing the islands militarily [sic]. Munitions were in comparatively short supply, had been procured from many diverse sources, and additional armaments were not available In the pipeline. The Argentine Navy lost the cruiser Belgrano early in the conflict and thereafter seldom ventured out of port. Argentine airpower was the main threat and performed well [sic]. The pilots were well trained, the Exocet guided missile was effective, and the tactics and techniques they employed were professionally executed. The British were ill-prepared to fight in an area far from home. Ascension Island which was about half the distance to the war zone, was used as a refueling stop and US logistical and fuel support was vital. The British land units were very effective and were better led than their Argentine counterparts. The local population was not harmed by the military operations. The British Navy performed well and the use of improved technology in radar, munitions, helicopter carriers, intelligence, and warning systems would have been helpful. In the post-war period the British improved the airport at Port Stanley and 4,500 soldiers were stationed there to guard a population of approximately 1,500. The British wanted to reduce tensions. The Argentines sought negotiations with sovereignty and the British refused to have negotiations without sovereignty. In the Argentine view, the situation remained unchanged."--Document. Cites over 800 substantial books, document collections, and journal articles about the diplomatic, military, and political aspects of the 1982 war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands; newspaper articles and works less than about 2,000 words are not included. Most of the works cited are in English or Spanish, giving British or Argentine perspectives, but other American and European views are also cited. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Most individuals realize that we have a moral obligation to avoid the evils of war. But this realization raises a host of difficult questions when we, as responsible individuals, witness harrowing injustices such as "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia or starvation in Somalia. With millions of lives at stake, is war ever justified? And, if so, for what purpose? In this book, Richard J. Regan confronts these controversial questions by first considering the basic principles of just-war theory and then applying those principles to historical and ongoing conflicts. Part One presents two opposing viewpoints: first, that war is not subject to moral norms and, second, that war is never morally permissible. The author rejects both perspectives, and moves to define the principles of just-war theory. He evaluates the roles of the president, Congress and, most importantly, the UN Security Council in determining when long-term US military involvement is justified. The moral limits of war conduct and the moral problem of using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons are also discussed. On the just cause to wage war, Regan argues that defense of nations and nationals - whether in self-defense or in defense of others - remains the "only" classical cause that in the modern world would justify resorting to war. With respect to military intervention in secessionist and revolutionary wars, he contends that such intervention might be justified, but that prudence dictates extreme caution. In considering acceptable war conduct, Regan elaborates the specific principle of discrimination and proportionality; he maintains that civilians uninvolved in the enemy's war should not be directly targeted and that the costs of military action must be proportionate to the anticipated benefits of destroying military targets. The second part of the book presents case studies of eight historical wars - World War I, the Vietnam War, the Falklands War, the revolution and civil war in Nicaragua, the civil war in El Salvador, the Gulf War, the intervention in Somalia, and the Bosnian War - and poses several provocative questions about each. It invites readers and students to apply just-war principles to complex war-related situations and to understand the factual contingencies involved in moral judgements about war decisions. The book should be of particular interest to students of the moral issues of international relations and to readers interested more generally in philosophy, theology and political science. This book looks at British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from 1975 through 1991, during which Mrs. Thatcher was Conservative Party Leader and then Prime Minister. Janet Fallon emphasizes her rhetorical appeals to enact a vision of social, economic, and political change in Britain. War and Revolution relates the events surrounding the years of military rule in Brazil, which lasted from 1964 to 1985 as well as military rule in Argentina and the Falklands War. The book explores the causes of the 1964 military coup in Brazil as well as the Falklands War, commenting on the events which took place in those countries. Also describes the social and political situation from an eyewitness perspective of the author, who had lived in South America from 1980 to 1984

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Conflict and Agency in the Falklands

This book offers an empirically informed understanding of how identity and agency become wholly embedded within practices of media-remembering. It draws upon data collected from the British military, the BBC and Falkland Islanders during the 30th Anniversary of the Falklands War to uniquely offer multiple perspectives on a single ‘remembering’ phenomenon. The study offers an analysis of the convergence, interconnectedness and interdependence of media and remembering, specifically the production, interpretation and negotiation of remembering in the media ecology. In so doing it not only examines the role of media in the formation and sustaining of collective memory but also the ways those who remember or are remembered in media texts become implicated in these processes.

Master's Thesis from the year 2015 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: Middle- and South America, grade: 1.5, University of Leicester (Department of Politics and International Relations), language: English, abstract: One spectrum of the orthodox narrative of the Malvinas campaign in 1982 implies that Argentina’s loss originated with its megalomania leadership. Their supposedly erratic moves cost the country 649 lives and caused national humiliation, but also initiated the process that terminated dictatorship. The other spectrum recognises a decisive, if hard-won, military success that turned into Margaret Thatcher’s landslide re-election victory. This orthodox narrative, however, blurs a thorough analysis of the war, because it misinterprets its causes. This study moves the analysis uncharted waters by investigating the alliance between Britain and Chile during the war. Chile’s effort was significant insofar as it helped to keep British losses down and provided intelligence that eventually led to the decision to sink the Belgrano, Britain, as part of the deal, transferred arms to Chile and helped to brush up the Pichonet dictatorship’s image abroad; thus sustaining it through its most precarious period, the severe economic crisis of 1982. Theoretical input by offensive realism and neo-Marxism provides the overall frame. Both are structural theories with particular focus on soil and territory. Chapter 2 distils prevalent aspects of both approaches and defends their use over agency-based theories like social constructivism and interpretivism. Chapter three is the entry point to Southern Cone geopolitics as it analyses the defining events of Chile-Argentine relations: the Pacific War of 1879-1883 and the Beagle Crisis in 1978. After Chapter four will have put these events in perspective the unorthodox conclusion emerges, arguing that the Falklands War was not an attack on British sovereignty per se but a move against Chile to obtain hegemony in the South Atlantic.

This monograph addresses the Malvinas/Falklands conflict from the Argentine perspective. Leaders must understand all sides of narratives in order to frame the right problem in armed conflicts. Existing Anglo-American literature does not reflect the complete narrative associated with the conflict. This does not mean that what has been written is not true, but that the Argentine view has not been captured effectively. This conflict escalated into war between Argentina and Great Britain between April and June of 1982, but the outcome of that war did not solve the problem. The author is an Argentine Army Aviator Officer who wants to take a balanced and objective view. The Anglo-American view interprets the Argentine behavior as an invasion, the Argentine view is perceived as a recovery of the Islands without bloodshed after 149 years of persistent claims. From the Argentine view the war was triggered by Great Britain with the British decision to sink the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano on 2nd May 1982, outside of the theater of operations, causing the deaths of more than three hundred Argentine sailors. Until that point in the conflict, Great Britain had suffered no casualties in the Argentine recovery of the Islands. The Malvinas/Falklands conflict includes issues about sovereignty, colonialism, and diplomatic misunderstandings. If the conflict reignites, it has the propensity and the potentiality to transmit the issues latent in the Argentine domestic conflict to the entire South American region, acting against the United Nations and the values of multilateralism in the international community.

This text, specifically for AQA specifications, is designed to be easy and encouraging for students to use. The book contains updated material and activities together with a new chapter on study skills. It also indicates clearly where activities meet the new evidence requirements for key skills.

This book explores the Falklands War from an Argentine perspective, taking into consideration three aspects. First, it introduces classified documents after the end of the thirty-year ban. Second, it highlights various conceptual, institutional, and doctrinal reforms in the Argentinian and other South American armed forces as a result of lessons learned from the Malvinas War. Third, it reflects on the war’s long-term implications on Argentina’s foreign policy and society. The book offers the first comprehensive, multi-level analysis, and Argentinean scholarship on the conflict. It is based on original primary data, mainly official documentation and interviews with military officers and combatants.

Soldiers and journalists alike wasted no time in telling the story of the campaign to recapture the Falkland Islands after the Argentinian invasion in April, 1982. Almost without exception, however, they are concerned largely on the role of the Army, for it was the part they played which particularly fired the public imagination, and it may be said that the role of the Royal and Merchant Navies, the abiding images of which are for many the pictures of the exploding frigate Antelope, and the burning Atlantic Conveyor, has hitherto been overshadowed by the yomping of the Marines and the exploits of certain gentleman of the press. Yet none of them would have been there at all had the Royal Navy not provided the necessary transport, not to mention air cover and bombardment support. In the book David Brown, head of what was formally the Naval Historical Branch at the Ministry of Defence, tells in full for the first time the extraordinary story of how the fleet was assembled; of how merchant-ships from luxury liners such as the Canberra to cargo-carriers of every description were ‘Taken Up Form Trade’ and, in a staggeringly short time, converted to their new role. He describes the stupendous problems presented by the assembling, and stowing, of thousands of tons of stores and equipment needed by the Expeditionary Forces and the way in which these problems were dealt with.

A fascinating new insight into the Falklands Conflict, covering every aspect of its origins and the political and diplomatic response to the Argentinean action as well as illuminating accounts of the military action to retake the islands, at every level of command. In June 2002, exactly twenty years after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, many of the key participants came together at a major international conference. This conference, held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and organized jointly by RMA Sandhurst and her sister institution Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, aimed to re-examine the events of spring 1982 from the perspective that only twenty intervening years can bring. The Conference mixed those who had participated in the events of spring and early summer 1982, diplomats, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen, with historians, political scientists and journalists. These accounts and interpretations of the conflict shed new light on one of the most interesting and controversial episodes in recent British history. This book shows how to predict wars. More specifically, it tells us how to anticipate in a timely fashion the scope and extent of interstate conflict. By focusing on how all governments--democratic or not--seek to secure public support before undertaking risky moves such as starting a war. Getting to War provides a methodology for identifying a regime’s intention to launch a conflict well in advance of the actual initiation. The goal here is the identification of leading indicators of war. Getting to War develops such a leading political indicator by a systematic examination of the ways in which governments influence domestic and international information flows. Regardless of the relative openness of the media system in question, we can accurately gauge the underlying intentions of those governments by a systematic analysis of opinion-leading articles in the mass media. This analysis allows us to predict both the likelihood of conflict and what form of conflict--military or diplomatic/economic--will occur. Theoretically, this book builds on a forty-year-old insight by Karl Deutsch--that all governments seek to mobilize public opinion through mass media and that careful analysis of such domestic media activity could provide an
"early warning network" of international conflict. By showing how to tap the link between conflict initiation and public support, this book provides both a useful tool for understanding crisis behavior as well as new theoretical insights on how domestic politics help drive foreign policy. Getting to War will be of interest to political scientists who study international disputes and national security as well as social scientists interested in media studies and political communication. General readers with an interest in military or diplomatic history—particularly U.S. history—will find that Getting to War provides an entirely new perspective on how to understand wars and international crises. W. Ben Hunt is Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University

In this official history of the Falklands Campaign, Lawrence Freedman provides a detailed and authoritative account of one of the most extraordinary periods in recent British political history and a vivid portrayal of a government at war. After the shock of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in April 1982, Margaret Thatcher faced the crisis that came to define her premiership as she determined to recover the islands. Freedman covers all aspects of the campaign - economic and diplomatic as well as military - and demonstrates the extent of the gamble that the government took. There are important accounts of the tensions in relations with the United States, concerns among the military commanders about the risks they were expected to take, the problems of dealing with the media and the attempts to reach a negotiated settlement. This definitive account describes in dramatic detail events such as the sinking of the Belgrano, the battle of Goose Green and the final push to Stanley. Special attention is also paid to the aftermath of the war, including the various enquiries, and the eventual restoration of diplomatic relations with Argentina. This is a collection of important new work on the Falklands Conflict by the leading authorities in the field, British and Argentine. The themes of the volume are defence and diplomacy, and the problematic relationship between them. The authors investigate aspects of the conflict from the relevance of Falklands/Malvinas past, through the diplomatic and military crisis of 1982, to shifts in public opinion in both countries. Contributors include Peter Beck, Peter Calvert, Lawrence Freedman, Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Guillermo Makin and Paul Rogers.

First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This work presents the Argentinian side of the battle for the Malvinas (Falklands). Commodore Moro, who took part in the operations on the Argentine side flying C-130s, later headed the Rattenbach Commission. This work points out the facts and circumstances that put Great Britain and Argentina on a collision course and treats the political and diplomatic aspects of the war as well as the day-by-day military operations in the South Atlantic. The work also presents the interaction of political and military events in modern conflict and an analysis of weapon systems in a modern war.

I en række afhandlinger gennemgås en række vigtige erfaringer fra Falklandskrigen, set ud fra et amerikansk synspunkt. A growing number of scholars have sought to re-centre emotions in our study of international politics, however an overarching book on how emotions matter to the study of politics and war is yet to be published. This volume is aimed at filling that gap, proceeding from the assumption that a nuanced understanding of emotions can only enhance our engagement with contemporary conflict and war. Providing a range of perspectives from a diversity of methodological approaches on the conditions, maintenance and interpretation of emotions, the contributors interrogate the multiple ways in which emotions function and matter to the study of global politics. Accordingly, the innovative contribution of this volume is its specific engagement with the role of emotions and constitution of emotional subjects in a range of different contexts of politics and war, including the gendered nature of war and security; war traumas; post-conflict reconstruction; and counterinsurgency operations. Looking at how we analyse emotions in war, why it matters, and what emotions do in global politics, this volume will be of interest to students and scholars of critical security studies and international relations alike.

From the television footage shown in all its stark reality and the daily coverage and subsequent memoirs, the impression delivered from the air battles in the Falklands Conflict was that of heroic Argentine pilots who relentlessly pressed home their attacks against the British. While, by contrast, there is a counter-narrative that portrayed the Sea Harrier force as being utterly dominant over its Argentine enemies. But what was the reality of the air war over the Falkland Islands? While books on the air operations have published since that time, they have, in the main, been personal accounts, re-told by those who were there, fighting at a tactical level, or back in their nation’s capital running the strategic implications of the outcome. But a detailed analysis of the operational level of the air war has not been undertaken — until now. At the same time, some analysts have inferred that this Cold War sideshow offers little insight into lessons for the operating environment of future conflicts. As the author demonstrates in this book, there are lessons from 1982 that do have important and continued relevance today. Using recently released primary source material, the author, a serving RAF officer who spent two-and-a-half years in the Falklands as an air defence navigator, has taken an impartial look at the air campaign at the operational level. This has enabled him to develop a considered view of what should have occurred, comparing it with what actually happened. In so doing, John Shields has produced a comprehensive account of the air campaign that has demolished many of the enduring myths. This is the story of not why, but how the air war was fought over the skies of the South Atlantic.

Contains analyses of the war by several prominent U.S. experts on national security affairs. Their observations reflect the continuing debate over such issues in U.S. defence planning - and in Soviet defence planning as well - as the controversy over large versus small carriers, the advantages and dis advantages of a diesel-versus nuclear-powered submarine fleet, the effectiveness of the Harrier-type aircraft, the influence of high technology on amphibious warfare, and the ever increasing use of ‘smart’ weapons by all-purpose conventional armed forces.

Trish Knight’s son Ben was killed in 2006 when RAF Nimrod XV230 exploded in mid-air over the war-torn landscape of Afghanistan. All 14 servicemen on board were killed - the largest loss of life in a single incident in the UK military since the Falklands War. The Knight family suddenly found themselves in the media spotlight. This is their story.

"As I toured the wards of that remarkable ship during my flying visit, I found all of my seriously wounded soldiers who had been helicoptered off the battlefield, some of whom I thought I would never see again, and saw for myself the inspirational care of the Naval medical and nursing staff that had saved lives and on which recovery was depending. It was hardly a mile offshore, but it felt a very long way from Mount Tumbledown." Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely KC, MC, Company Commander in 2nd Battalion Scots Guards 1982 "These are the personal stories of the injured servicemen and the Naval Nurses and Doctors who fought the all-important battle to 'bring them back alive'." Brian Hanrahan BBC War Correspondent during The Falklands War 1982 "The story of dedication and courage on The Hospital Ship Uganda. Author Nicci Pugh honours all those who were treated and served on board Her Majesty's Hospital Ship Uganda during the Falklands War in 1982. Michael Nicholson CBE, ITN War Correspondent during the Falklands War 1982 "Nicci Pugh is to be congratulated on weaving together the threads of this hidden side of the Falklands conflict. A success story emerges of inter-service co-operation, which shows what can be achieved when there is no precedent to follow. White Ship - Red Crosses explains why The Hospital Ship Uganda..."
became such a reassuring presence to those fighting in the South Atlantic in 1982.” Captain Grahame A. Burton RD* FNI In 1982 P&O Chief Officer SS Uganda and Lt Cdr RNR “Not before time, the story of the Naval nursing staff on board The Hospital Ship Uganda is being told. My own memories are vague regarding much of the early days after the bombing of the Sir Galahad, but nothing detracts from the comfort and security I felt as I was cared for and nursed on board The Hospital Ship at that time. Much has been written regarding the battles and the soldier’s point of view during the Falklands War, but the perspective of the medical teams has often been overlooked and ignored. This is a story that needs to be told and listened to, not just because it is a great book and a very good read but because of its powerful message. White Ship - Red Crosses is a triumph for all injured servicemen but let’s not forget the tributes deserved by those unrelentingly hard-working nurses and medical teams, without whom my survival would not have been possible. Author Nicci Pugh, who worked as an Operating Theatre Sister in the midst of the casualties as they arrived on board The Hospital Ship Uganda in 1982 has captured the whole essence of treating and caring for the casualties on a mass scale in a war zone.” Simon Weston CBE Former patient on board Her Majesty’s Hospital Ship Uganda, during The Falklands War 1982 “Not before time, the story of the Naval nursing staff on board The Hospital Ship Uganda. This is a story that needs to be told.” Simon Weston CBE

Examines the political atmosphere and events leading to the Falklands war and concludes that the war was caused by critical misperceptions on both sides. Analyzes British response with emphasis on force selection, strategy, ‘Jointness, and the role of airpower. Suggests that British victory hinged on a well-coordinated, joint warfighting effort, and highlights the key role played by airpower, Concludes with a caution concerning the potential for worldwide perceptions of reduced US power projection capabilities in light of budget-induced force reductions. Warns that these perceptions could lead, as they did in the Falklands, to military conflict. (FR). Panoramic, transnational history of the Falklands War and its imperial dimensions, which explores how a minor squabble mushroomed into war.

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